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PERANAN KONSISTENSI DALAM STATUS SHARIAH ATAS 
PERHUBUNGAN ANTARA MEKANISME TADBIR URUS KORPORAT 
DALAMAN DAN KEYAKINAN PELABUR: BUKTI DI KALANGAN  
SYARIKAT-SYARIKAT PATUH SHARIAH INDONESIA 
 
 
  ABSTRAK  
 
 
 Kegawatan pasaran saham yang dicetuskan oleh skandal perniagaan, 
penipuan perdagangan, dan kegagalan bank telah menyebabkan keyakinan pelabur 
menjunam. Berdasarkan latar belakang ini, syarikat-syarikat yang mematuhi Shariah, 
walaupun bahagian pasaran modalnya adalah kecil berbanding pelaburan 
konvensional, mengalami pertumbuhan luar biasa akibat daripada permintaan 
pelabur yang tinggi bagi pematuhan korporat dengan standard etika dan tadbir urus 
korporat yang lebih baik. Untuk menangani jurang perbezaan ini, kajian ini 
memeriksa pengaruh maklumat mengenai kualiti kawalan dalaman (proses lembaga 
pengarah, struktur lembaga pengarah, komposisi lembaga pengarah, dan karakteristik 
lembaga pengarah) keatas keyakinan pelabur, serta kesan interaksi yang konsisten 
dalam status patuh Shariah keatas kualiti hubungan antara mekanisme dalaman 
tadbir urus korporat (proses lembaga pengarah, struktur lembaga pengarah, 
komposisi lembaga pengarah, dan karakteristik lembaga pengarah) dan keyakinan 
pelabur. Kajian ini menganalisa 227 sampel syarikat bukan kewangan yang terdapat 
dalam Senarai Shariah Sekuriti (DES) di Indonesia dengan menggunakan descriptive 
statistics, t-tests, and moderated multiple regressions. Hasil kesan utama 
menunjukkan bahawa struktur lembaga pengarah dan komposisi lembaga pengarah 
mempunyai kaitan yang positif dengan keyakinan pelabur, manakala proses lembaga 
pengarah dan karakteristik lembaga pengarah mempunyai impak yang negatif keatas 
xix 
 
keyakinan pelabur. Nampaknya usaha ikatan korporat dalam pendedahan maklumat 
mengenai kualiti struktur lembaga pengarah dan komposisi lembaga pengarah 
berjaya mempengaruhi keyakinan pelabur. Penemuan kesan interaksi menunjukkan 
ketekalan dalam status patuh Shariah menguatkan kesan maklumat mengenai kualiti 
proses lembaga pengarah, komposisi lembaga pengarah, serta karakteristik lembaga 
pengarah terhadap keyakinan pelabur. Analisis selanjutnya menunjukkan bahawa 
sebarang maklumat yang tinggi mengenai kualiti komposisi lembaga pengarah, 
keyakinan pelabur dalam syarikat-syarikat yang konsisten adalah lebih tinggi 
berbanding dengan syarikat-syarikat yang tidak konsisten. Bagaimanapun, tidak ada 
keyakinan pelabur yang berbeza antara syarikat-syarikat yang konsisten dan yang 
tidak konsisten dari aspek maklumat yang tinggi mengenai kualiti proses lembaga 
pengarah serta karakteristik lembaga pengarah. Sementara itu, dari segi maklumat 
rendah tentang kualiti proses lembaga pengarah serta karakteristik lembaga 
pengarah, keyakinan pelabur dalam syarikat-syarikat yang konsisten adalah lebih 
tinggi berbanding dengan syarikat-syarikat yang tidak konsisten. Penemuan ini 
menggambarkan bahawa keyakinan pelabur dalam pendedahan maklumat mengenai 
kualiti komposisi lembaga pengarah, proses lembaga pengarah, serta karakteristik 
lembaga pengarah dapat dipertingkatkan dengan mengekalkan pematuhan korporat 
secara konsisten. Dalam erti kata lain, maklumat tentang ketekalan pematuhan 
korporat kepada prinsip-prinsip Shariah membantu usaha ikatan korporat dalam 
mendedahkan maklumat mengenai kualiti komposisi lembaga pengarah, proses 
lembaga pengarah serta karakteristik lembaga pengarah untuk meningkatkan 
keyakinan pelabur, khususnya dimana pelaporan korporat adalah terhad. 
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THE ROLE OF CONSISTENCY IN SHARIA STATUS 
ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNAL CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS AND INVESTORS’ CONFIDENCE: 
EVIDENCE AMONG INDONESIAN SHARIA COMPLIANT COMPANIES  
 
  ABSTRACT  
 Stock market turmoil triggered by business scandals, trading fraud, and bank 
failures has caused investor confidence to plummet. However, against that 
background, Sharia-compliant companies though relatively small in terms of market 
shares compared to their conventional counterparts have experienced phenomenal 
growth due arguably to high investor requirements for corporate compliance with 
ethical standards and improved corporate governance. To address this gap, this study 
examines the influence of information relating to the quality of internal corporate 
governance mechanisms (board process, board structure, board composition, and 
board characteristic) on investor confidence, and the influence of consistency in 
Sharia compliant status on the quality of the relationship between internal corporate 
governance mechanisms and investor confidence. A total of 227 samples of non-
financial companies from the Sharia Securities (DES) in Indonesia was analysed 
using descriptive statistics, t-tests, and moderated multiple regressions. It was found 
that board structure and board composition were positively related to investor 
confidence, whereas board process and board characteristic were negatively related 
to investor confidence. Apparently, corporate bonding efforts in information 
disclosure about the quality of board structure as well as board composition 
succeeded in influencing investor confidence. The findings further reveal that 
consistency in Sharia-compliant status is an important aspect influencing the 
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relationship between information about the quality of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms (board process, board composition, and board characteristics) and 
investor confidence. Further analysis shows that investor confidence in high 
information on the quality of board composition is higher for consistent rather than 
inconsistent Sharia status companies. However, there is no difference in investor 
confidence in high information about the quality of board process as well as board 
characteristic between companies with consistent and inconsistent Sharia status. 
Nevertheless, investor confidence in low information of quality of board process as 
well as board characteristic was higher in companies’ demonstrating consistent 
Sharia status compared to those that did not. These findings illustrate that investor 
confidence in information disclosure on quality of board composition, board process, 
as well as board characteristic could be enhanced by consistently maintaining 
corporate compliance. In other words, information about consistent compliance with 
Sharia principles complements corporate bonding efforts in disclosing information 
about the quality of those three board elements in order to boost investor confidence, 
particularly where corporate reporting is limited. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION   
    
1.1 Introduction 
 This chapter presents an overview of the study, covering the background, 
problem statement, research objectives, research questions, significance, definition 
of key terms, scope of research, and organization of the thesis. 
  
1.2 Background of Study 
 The stock market is an economic institution that aids governments and 
companies to access long-term capital resources. By making non-debt financial 
capital accessible, the stock market increases the level of economic production and 
the prosperity of a country (Osinubi, 2004) The stock market sources funds from 
investors, who are willing to invest their funds at some level of risk. Thus, this study 
focuses on an analysis of stock market relationships in the form of investor risk 
preference, as well as compliance in the modern-day stock market. The specific aim 
of this study is to explore these areas in the context of Sharia-compliant stock and 
the compliance of Sharia compliant companies to Sharia principles. 
 Globally, the market capitalisation of companies contributes over half of the 
world's gross domestic product (GDP) from 2000 to 2012. Even in 2007 GDP 
achieved a peak contribution (107.87 percent). It displays continuous levels of 
growth demonstrating that these types of financial investments are interesting for 
potential investors (McKinsey, 2007; Lund, Daruvala, Dobbs, Harie, Kwek, & 
Falcon, 2013). 
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 However, the fluctuation of global equity assets and market capitalisation has 
been directly proportional fluctuations in investors’ confidence, as shown in Figure 
1.1. From this, it can be implied that stock market development is related to 
investors’ confidence in the stock market. 
Source: State Street Corporation (2003, 2012); McKinsey (2007), Lund et al. (2013) 
Figure 1.1  Global Market Growth. 
 The steady growth of global financial assets held in the stock market during 
2000 – 2012 (Figure 1.1) quantitatively reveals that investors found these financial 
investments attractive (Dodge, 2003; Gordon, 2006; Valiante, 2010) and that the 
stock market had gained the confidence of investors over this period (Kelly, 2010; 
Phillips, 2012). However, during this period, corporate scandals, insider trading 
fraud, and bank failures hit markets and eroded investor confidence. The investor 
confidence index weakened from 280.75 in 2004, to 87.793 in 2012. The 2007 
financial collapse was triggered by the downfall of Enron Company, which was 
followed by the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis. Figure 1.2 show investor confidence 
plummeted between 2005 and 2012. Concerned investors exited the market, causing 
stock prices to decline (Allen, 2002; Dwyer, & Tkac, 2009) by as much as 50 
percent. 
-
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Source: State Street Corporation (2003, 2012) 
Figure 1.2  Global Investor Confidence Index. 
 This global stock market crash and financial crisis impacted Asia and 
especially ASEAN countries, including Indonesia. Investment rates in Indonesia 
revealed a decline in stock prices and market indexes by more than 100 percent from 
2007 to 2008. Indonesia and Vietnam suffered the worst declines, more than 150 
percent (Gochoco-Bautista, 2012). The charts below demonstrate the decline in 
investment rates (Figure 1.3) and stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP 
in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries from 1960 
through 2009 (Figure1.4).  
 
Source: Gochoco-Bautista, & Remolona (2012) 
Figure 1.3  Investment Rates in ASEAN. 
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Source: Gochoco-Bautista (2012) 
Figure 1.4  ASEAN Market Capitalisation as a Percentage of GDP. 
 The stock market turmoil was initially created by a credit crisis for listed 
companies dependent on bank finance (Gochoco-Bautista & Remolona, 2012). 
Throughout ASEAN, companies faced loan repayment problems. In Indonesia and 
Thailand, this represented 50% of total loans, and in Malaysia, 20 percent of total 
loans (Burton, Tseng, & Kang, 2006). The high number of non-performing loans 
scared investors, who understood companies to have high bankruptcy risk. In the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, investors continued to be risk averse in their 
financial decision-making, which can be seen from Figures 1.3 and 1.4. With 
investors cautious of investing in ASEAN countries, Indonesia faced negative net 
flows of portfolio investment, as shown in Figure 1.5. 
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Figure 1.5  Portfolio Investment of ASEAN Countries (ne
 Over the last decade, ASEAN countries have experienced highly fluctuating 
net flows of portfolio investment. The net flow of portfolio investment is the 
difference between the value of portfolio investment inflow and outflow. The only
country to experience a positive value of net flow is Thailand, which has the lowest 
fluctuation  of  portfolio 
net flow but also high fluctuation, whereas Malaysia showed slightly positive net 
flow with moderate fluctuation in portfolio investment flows. Philippines and 
Indonesia experienced negative net flows of portfolio investment. Overall, ASEAN 
countries saw a larger outflow of portfolio investment. Therefore, it can be implied 
that investors remain averse to investing funds in ASEAN countries, especially in 
Indonesia and the Philippines.
 Several institutions have conducted anecdotal surveys in an effort to identify 
the factors that determine and build investor confidence. Table 1.1 shows th
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Table 1.1: Investors’ Demands Based on Investor Survey Results  
Selection Criteria 
Survey 
Findings 
(percentage) 
Variables/ Dimensions 
1. McKinsey (2002)    
Higher corporate transparency 52 Corporate Governance  
More independent board 44 Corporate Governance 
More effective boardroom by improving director 
selection process, Board evaluation process, and  
Higher directors’ commitment 
38 Corporate Governance 
2. Ernst & Young (2012)   
Long-term investment performance   (3-5 years) 60 Performance 
Management team 82 Corporate Governance 
Clarity and consistency of investment philosophy 66 
Consistency and  
Corporate Governance 
Risk management policies and oversight 70 Corporate Governance 
Recent investment performance (1-2 years) 16 Performance 
Fees and liquidity terms  44 Performance 
3. CFA (2013)   
Improve corporate governance practices 21 Corporate Governance 
Improve transparency 32 Corporate Governance 
More corporate compliance with existing regulation 35 
Consistency in 
Compliance 
Improve corporate culture 34 Culture 
Increase compliance to ethical codes and standards 35 Compliance 
4. World Economic Forum (Schwab & Martín, 2012).   
Accountability 
Strength of auditing and reporting standards  
Efficacy of corporate Boards 
Protection of minority shareholders’ interests 
Strength of investor protection (First pillar required 
for global competitiveness) 
50 Corporate Governance 
Sources: McKinsey (2002); Ernst and Young (2012); Schwab & Sala-i-Martín, (2012); CFA (2013) 
 
 Overall, investors demanded improvements in corporate governance and 
consistency in a company’s compliance. Specifically, investors required improved 
short- and long-term performance reporting and market liquidity assessments (Ernst 
& Young, 2012). In addition, investors sought improved corporate governance 
mechanisms, in particular improvements in disclosure from Boards of directors to 
provide certainty information about their function (around 30 – 50 percent 
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respondents) (McKinsey, 2002; Schwab and Sala-i-Martín, 2012; World Economic 
Forum [WEF], 2012). Ethical conduct and corporate transparency were the third 
major concern of investors (30 – 52 percent of total respondents) (CFA, 2013), who 
cited improving corporate disclosure of the Boards of directors (approximately 50 
percent of surveyed investors) (McKinsey, 2002; Ernst & Young, 2012; WEF, 2012; 
CFA, 2013). 
 Consistency in a company’s compliance, with ethical codes and standards is 
considered paramount by many investors, who consider these aspects as non-
negotiable tools in investment philosophy (Ernst & Young, 2012; CFA, 2013). 
Accordingly, 35 percent of investors demanded improved attitudes in corporate 
culture, along with an increased compliance with ethical codes and standards (CFA, 
2013). Furthermore, 66 percent of investors sought increased clarity and consistency 
in meeting future goals, and wanted companies to meet benchmarks (Ernst & Young, 
2012). The survey also revealed that investors expected companies to develop a 
vibrant corporate culture with a disciplined corporate compliance, ethical codes, and 
standards (35percent of respondents) (CFA, 2013). The World Economic Forum 
[WEF] survey also reported that investors needed to protect their minority 
shareholders’ interests (approximately 50 ]percent of respondents) (WEF, 2012).  
 To meet investors’ demands that companies comply with ethical standards, 
capital markets attempted to build ethical investment indices (such as ACT 
Australian Cleantech Index; FTSE Environmental Technology Index Series; FTSE4 
Good Index Series; Dow Jones Islamic Market Index; India Islamic Index; Social 
Responsibility Index; FTSE Islamic Index). The indexes comprise companies that 
operate to ethical standards with the aim to protect investors from unethical 
behaviour and enhance confidence.  
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 Islamic investment and securities are now widely recognised as an alternative 
ethical investment. Driven by investors’ need for Sharia compliant investment, 
Islamic funds are increasingly sought after. The growth rate in Islamic equity funds 
has exploded, with a mere USD 800 million in 1996 increasing to USD 3.6 billion in 
2003, USD 17.33 billion in 2007 (Abderrezak, 2008) and USD 56 billion in 2014 
(Thomson Reuters, 2014). 
 Moreover, Islamic market performance in several ASEAN countries also 
provided better market capitalisation growth compared to developed, western 
markets, especially before the global financial crisis in 2008, see Figure 1.6. The 
figure compares market capitalisation between the top 11 markets and traded 
volumes of OIC countries, including Indonesia and ASEAN countries,and the 
growth of market capitalisation in developed countries, indicated by the 20 top 
market capitalisation and traded volume. Islamic market capitalisation in countries 
included in Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) showed that growth of the 
Islamic market capitalisations is higher than developed market capitalisations (Rizvi, 
Dewandaru, Bacha, & Masih, 2014). 
 
Source: Rizvi et al. (2014)    
Figure 1.6   Growth of Average of Market Capitalisation to GDP, Islamic Markets 
Versus Developed Markets. 
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 Figure 1.6 highlights that Islamic capital markets showed positive growth 
while the developed markets showed negative growth, except in 2006 and 2007. 
Even in 2007-08 financial crisis, Islamic capital markets showed positive growth, 
whereas developed markets experienced negative growth 
 Furthermore, Indonesia, with Muslims accounting for 85 percent of the 305.6 
million citizens, exhibits a great potential market for Sharia compliant securities, 
(Badan Pusat Statistik
at only 1 percent of the potential market in Indonesia (Sindonews.com, 2011), there 
is a substantial opportunity to continue the market share of Sharia compliant 
companies. The current investment companies have maintained positive growth o
the last decade. Figure 1.7 highlights the positive market capitalisation of Islamic 
investment in Indonesian Stock exchange. 
Source: :Badan Pengawas Pasar Modal
Figure 1.7   Market Capitalisation of Jakarta Islamic Index in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX).
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growth in the number of Sharia compliant companies in Indonesia from 2007 to 2012
(Bapepam, 2012). 
Source: :Badan Pengawas Pasar Modal
Figure 1.8   The Number of Sharia Compliant Companies in Indonesia.
 Although the 
capitalisation of Islamic Index, in Indonesia grew, the current 
Islamic finance remains 1 percent of the potential market in Indonesia 
(Sindonews.com, 2011).
been able to attract Islamic investment, even though Islamic equity funds manage 
approximately 26 percent of global Islamic financial assets
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 Attribution theory states that perceivers (in the context of the study, 
investors) rely on actors’ attributes to interpret and understand actors’ actions, 
leading to an increase in perceivers’ confidence in decision making (Kelley, 1967; 
Rotter, 1967; Tyler, 1990). Previous empirical evidence showed that investors 
attributed information about corporate failure as a reflection of ineffective and 
inefficient corporate management to undertake and supervise corporate actions 
(Keasey, Thompson, & Wright, 2005). With Islamic investments, investors may 
attribute information about the poor quality of internal corporate mechanisms as a 
reflection ineffective internal control mechanisms in companies with Sharia status, 
lowering investor confidence in Sharia compliant companies. 
 Moreover, Sharia compliant companies’ are required to comply with Sharia 
principles, a faith-based control mechanism on corporate activities (Shukri, 2008; 
Hassan, Triyanta, & Yusoff, 2011). In the context of Islam, faith is closely related to 
istiqamah (consistent in faith-based deeds) (QS. Hud 11:112; Al-Fussilat 41:30). 
Istiqamah is positive attitude reflecting work under the direction of Sharia principles 
(Khadijah, Kamaluddin, & Salin, 2015). Combined with attribution theory, which 
asserts that consistent information about consistent actions of an actor lead a 
perceiver to attribute the information as a reflection of consistent behavior (Kelley & 
Michela, 1980), the attribution of consistent Sharia compliance could be an 
important source to enhance a perceiver’s confidence in decision-making. Vodicka 
(2006) argued that consistency was a key element for building trust or confidence, 
but that consistency could not work alone. Consequently, information about 
consistent inclusion in list of Sharia securities should assist other key elements of 
faith-based activities to build investor confidence.  
    
 
 In Indonesia, to be a registered Sharia compliant company, and on the list of
Sharia Securities or Dafta
Sharia criteria determined by the capital market authority. 
rules governing companies’ inclusion in DES, and companies who fail
criteria should be excluded. For example,
were excluded from DES because of a high debt ratio, and another ten companies 
were excluded due to a high ratio of interest income (Lia, 2012). Nevertheless, 
excluded firms can enroll for re
screening criteria requirements approved by capital market authority (Bapepam_LK 
along with National Sharia Council or 
process enables a company to exit and re
meet the established screening criteria, without any penalty. Figure 1.9 shows the 
number of Sharia-compliant companies with exchange status in the stock market and 
each DES issuance, from the first issuance in 2007 until 2012. 
 
Source:Bapepam  (2012)
 
Figure 1.9  The Number of Companies Changed
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 Given poor internal corporate governance mechanisms of Indonesia Listed 
Companies (ADB, 2014), as well as the existence of companies whose DES status 
have been changed by capital market authority (Bapepam, 2012), investors may be 
less confident about corporate insiders’ oversight of corporate activities. This area is 
not well understood, because few studies have investigated the relationships between 
internal corporate governance mechanisms and investor confidence for Sharia 
compliant companies, or the role of information about consistent Sharia compliance.  
 In addition, despite investigation links between internal corporate governance 
mechanism and investor behavior for conventional companies, the findings are 
inconclusive (Brickley, 1986; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; Gaver, Gaver, & 
Battistel, 1992; Rosenstein, & Wyatt, 1997; Holderness, Kroszner, & Sheehan, 1999; 
Lawler III, Finegold, Benson, & Conger, 2001; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003; 
Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005; Choi, J., Han, & Lee, 2010; Chatterjee, 2011; 
Danoshana & Ravivathani, 2013). Specifically, for Sharia compliant companies, 
previous literature focused on developing conceptual models, effectiveness of 
corporate actions (Bakhtiar & Nazli, 2003; Grais & Pellegrini, 2006), and identifying 
the fundamental principles controlling the actions of Sharia compliant companies 
(i.e., Islamic Financial Services Board [IFSB], 2009; Rahim, Shith, & Osman, 2012; 
Mizushima & Mizushima, 2014).Some empirical evidence is available, but these 
studies focused on financial performance of Sharia compliant companies (i.e., 
Hussein, 2004;2007, Elfakhani & Hassan, 2005; Setiawan & Oktariza, 2013) and the 
influence of internal corporate governance mechanism on the effectiveness of 
corporate actions (i.e., Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Rahman & Bukair, 2013). To address 
these limitations, the present study investigated the link between information about 
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the quality of internal corporate governance mechanisms and investor confidence in 
Sharia compliant companies. 
 It is of no surprise to note that there is a lack of literature investigating the 
role of information on consistent Sharia compliance, or DES status, as a driver. 
Further, previous literature on the role of consistency in building trust or confidence 
was still in form of normative perspective. These studies suggested that consistency 
served as a driver (Argandoña, 2008), or a moderator (Das & Teng, 1998) for 
building trust or confidence in an organization or partner cooperation.  
 In addition, consistent DES status can also be perceived as a representation of 
an external control mechanisms, because DES status can be a disciplinary force on 
corporate insiders to satisfy Sharia principles. While previous literature did discuss 
the function of external control mechanisms in an effort to assist internal control 
mechanisms to reduce agency problems, the results were debatable. For example, on 
one side, external control mechanisms were perceived as complementary for internal 
control mechanisms (Walsh & Seward, 1990; Chenhall, 2003). On the other hand, 
external control mechanisms were suggested as a substitute for internal control 
mechanisms due to the failure of internal control mechanisms in the era global 
financial crisis (Jensen, 1993). 
 The output of this research produced a number of integrated theoretical 
frameworks and research agendas for interconnectedness between internal and 
external controls (Walsh & Seward, 1990; Chenhall, 2003).Several studies attempted 
to investigate the integrative relationship between internal and external control 
mechanisms and corporate performance, but the studies focused on conventional 
companies and the findings were inconclusive (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Weir, 
Laing, & McKnight, 2002; Waymire, & Stanley, 2008). For Islamic investment and 
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companies, there is a dearth of empirical research investigating an integrated 
relationship between internal controls, represented by internal corporate governance 
mechanisms, and external controls, represented by consistent compliance with Sharia 
principles.  
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
 As a result of the corporate and financial scandals that have occurred in the  
last 20 years, corporate governance mechanisms have experienced a confidence 
crisis with investors (Allen, 2002). Governments have put in place mechanisms to 
improve corporate governance, such as the US Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, but the 
real practices in corporate governance, financial management, and supervision are 
still questionable (Lee & McKibbin, 2007).As a result, investor confidence fluctuates 
and has even descended over the last decade (State Street Corporation, 2003, 2012).   
 One area of increasing interest to investors, as a device of internal corporate 
governance, is measuring and reporting the integrity of the board of commissioners 
or directors. Previous studies have identified that investors not only place improved 
internal corporate governance mechanisms as their top priority, but also expect 
companies to have a consistent corporate philosophy, compliance with ethical 
standards, and high transparency (McKinsey, 2002; Ernst & Young, 2012; Schwab 
& Martin, 2012; CFA, 2013). 
 Another trend is the increasing demand for Sharia compliant companies and 
investments from Muslim investors. The rapid growth in these new financial 
structures is supported by the fact that Islamic market capitalisation is growing at a 
faster rate than developed markets. This implies that investors are becoming more 
interested in Islamic investment instruments, rather than existing products in 
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developed markets (Rizvi et al., 2014). In Indonesia, the Islamic capital market has 
continued to grow following the 2008 global financial crisis (Bapepam,2012), but its 
market share is still relatively small, approximately 1.5 percent of the total global 
market share of Islamic assets (Kusuma, 2013). 
 Given great potential market of Sharia compliant companies in Indonesia, 
Islamic investments faced challenges to attract investors especially Musim investors 
to invest in Sharia compliant companies in Indonesia. This phenomena motivated 
this study to embark on question how to attract investors to invest in Sharia 
compliant companies in Indonesia. 
 An essential task is for companies to implement corporate transparency, 
institutional frameworks with rule-enforcement procedures for Islamic business and 
financial architectures. Once in place, these structures enable a company to clearly 
disclose that Sharia principles underlie day-to-day activities, and public and private 
economic and social affairs (Akhtar, 2008). However, previous studies have found 
that Sharia compliant companies release limited information related to procedures 
and structures that control company activities and keep them compliant with Sharia 
principles (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007). Even Darmadi (2011), who investigated the 
Islamic Bank of Indonesia, which had a thorough implementation of Islamic 
ideological and legal frameworks, found that the bank disclosed limited information 
about Sharia supervision, internal control mechanisms, and corporate governance 
implementation. 
 Achieving a high level of corporate transparency is highly dependent on the 
quality of internal control mechanisms around Sharia principles and companies 
disclosing adequate information. Rahman & Bukair (2013) confirmed that internal 
control mechanism significantly impact the level of corporate disclosure when they 
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investigated the link between internal legal structures represented by Sharia 
supervisory board and the level of corporate social responsibility disclosure. 
 Although many academicians have noted the significant role of internal 
control mechanisms (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1994; Taylor & Walker, 
1994; Beccerra & Gupta, 1999; Greller & Simpson, 1999; Lui & Ngo, 2004; Ng & 
Feldman, 2008; Rivas, Hamori, & Mayo, 2009) on effective corporate control, 
corporate performance (Ruigrok, Peck, Tacheva, Greve, & Hu, 2006; Wu & Tuttle, 
2009), as well as on market reaction (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Murphy, 1985; 
Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005; Iqbal, Wang, & Sewon, 2011; Francis, Hasan, & Wu, 
2012).  However, other findings show inconclusive results, especially on the market 
reaction to internal corporate governance mechanisms (Brickley, 1986; Gaver et al., 
1992; Conyon & Peck, 1998; Mak & Li, 2001; Choi, Choe, & Kwak, 2010; Uadiale, 
2010). These studies suggested that internal corporate governance mechanisms still 
required further investigation to find attributes that boost investor confidence. This is 
especially true for ASEAN countries that have poor internal corporate governance 
disclosure, which includes Indonesia (CLSA, 2007, 2012; 2010; ADB, 2014). 
 The second challenge for companies is to build an integrated framework that 
establishes sustainable Islamic capital market growth. Previous literature attempted 
to build theoretical framework that explained the integrated relationship between the 
attributes of the board of directors, the external environment and their influence on 
corporate performance (Zahra & Pearce,1989; Walsh & Seward, 1990). The 
integrated model was expected to overcome the problem of corporate bonding effort, 
in the form of corporate governance disclosure reporting, to build stronger investor 
confidence in business and financial cooperation. In addition, empirical studies that 
examined the integrated relationship between internal and external control 
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mechanisms and corporate performance (Gompers et al., 2003; Moustafa, 2004; Li, 
Rupley, & Johnstone, 2007; Waymire & Stanley, 2008; Dharmastuti & Wahyudi, 
2013) presented mixed results, such as Li et al. (2007), who questioned the 
effectiveness of an integrated relationship. 
 Some studies have examined the influence of other external control 
mechanisms on corporate performance, such as market for corporate control 
(Gompers et al., 2003), corporate governance standards (Heenetigala & Armstrong, 
2011), other standards/provisions/regulations (Agrawal & Chadha, 2003), analyst 
following, blockholders/major shareholders (Li et al., 2007; Dharmastuti & 
Wahyudi, 2013), and the labour market (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Conyon & Peck, 
1998) in conventional companies. Whereas, studies that investigated Sharia 
compliant companies built conceptual frameworks, as suggested by Grais and 
Pellegrini (2006). Their integrative framework contained internal and external 
features of Islamic financial services and corporate reputation. However, studies of 
external control mechanisms, represented by consistency in companies' compliance 
with Sharia principles, have not, to the author's knowledge, been conducted. 
Furthermore, empirical evidence of the integrative framework for Sharia compliant 
companies is still rare.  
 Also lacking are studies investigating the relationship between internal and 
external control mechanisms and investor confidence. To the author's knowledge, 
this area has not been tested. Ishi, Gompers and Metrick (2003) argued that if 
corporate governance mechanisms (as a device for corporate control mechanism) 
substantially affected corporate performance, then the market would integrate this 
through stock price movements. They suggested that stock price movements were 
driven by investors' investment decisions; hence capital market development would 
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be determined by investor confidence. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the 
integrated relationship between internal and external corporate governance 
mechanisms and their influence on investor confidence in Sharia compliant 
companies. 
 To address the issues, challenges, and problems faced by Sharia compliant 
companies in Indonesia, as well as the lack of studies examining consistency in 
Sharia status, the current study examined whether the integrated relationship between 
internal corporate governance mechanism and consistency in Sharia status, as a 
representation of external control mechanisms, can overcome these problems. Hence, 
this study investigated the relationship between internal corporate governance 
mechanisms and investor confidence and considered consistency in Sharia status as a 
moderator strengthening the relationship between internal control mechanisms and 
investor confidence. 
   
1.4 Research Objectives 
 This study examined four dimensions of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms, namely board process, board structure, board composition, and board 
characteristics. The main objective of this study is to examine relationship between 
the four dimensions and investor confidence, and interaction relationship between 
consistency in Sharia status and the four dimensions on investor confidence. To 
achieve the study objectives, the following eight objectives were developed:  
   
1.4.1 Main Effect   
1. To examine the relationship between information about the quality of 
board processes and investor confidence; 
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2. To determine the relationship between information about the quality of 
board structure and investor confidence; 
3. To investigate the relationship between information about the quality of 
board composition and investor confidence; and 
4. To examine the relationship between information about the quality of 
board characteristics and investor confidence 
 
1.4.2 Interaction Effect   
1. To determine the existence of moderating effect of consistency in Sharia 
status on the relationship between information about the quality of board 
process and investor confidence; 
2. To examine the presence of moderating effect of consistency in Sharia 
status on the relationship between information about the quality of board 
structure and investor confidence; 
3. To investigate the existence moderating effect of consistency in Sharia 
status on the relationship between information about the quality of board 
composition and investor confidence; and 
4. To determine the presence moderating effect of consistency in Sharia 
status on the relationship between information about the quality of board 
characteristics and investor confidence. 
 
1.5 Research Questions 
 The current study has developed the following research questions: 
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1.5.1 Main Effect   
1. What is the relationship between information about the quality of board 
process and investor confidence? 
2. What is the relationship between information about the quality of board 
structure and investor confidence? 
3. What is the relationship between information about the quality of board 
composition and investor confidence? 
4. What is the relationship between information about the quality of board 
characteristics and investor confidence? 
 
1.5.2 Interaction Effect   
1. To what extent does consistency in Sharia status moderate the 
relationship between information about the quality of board process and 
investor confidence? 
2. To what extent does consistency in Sharia status moderate the 
relationship between information about the quality of board structure and 
investor confidence? 
3. To what extent does consistency in Sharia status moderate the 
relationship between information about the quality of board composition 
and investor confidence?  
4. To what extent does consistency in Sharia status moderate the 
relationship between information about the quality of board characteristic 
and investor confidence?  
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1.6 Significance of the Study 
 This study makes valuable contributions to the following practical and 
theoretical statutes, as outlined below: 
    
1.6.1 Theoretical Contribution 
 Due to the global financial crisis, corporate governance mechanisms have 
experienced an investor confidence crisis (Allen, 2002). Previous surveys identified 
investor expectation to a number of improvements in internal corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as consistent corporate philosophy, compliance with ethical 
standards, and high transparency (McKinsey & Company. 2002; Ernst & Young, 
2012; Schwab & Martin, 2012; CFA 2013) that were expected to help boosting 
investor confidence. Numerous study relating internal corporate governance and 
corporate performance as well as likelihood of corporate fraud have been undertaken 
(e.g.,La Porta, Lopez, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000; Mitton, 2002; Bastaman & 
Hertanto, 2003; Farber, 2004; Kouki, Elkhaldi, Atri, & Souid, 2011; Suvankulov & 
Ogucu, 2012). Despite there have been numerous efforts to improve corporate 
governance, the effect of real practices of corporate governance on effectiveness of 
corporate supervision and corporate performance are still in questionable (Lee & 
McKibbin, 2007).  
 Further, even though Islamic capital markets have experienced rapid growth 
as high expectation toward ethical investment, Islamic investments also face 
challenges (Kammer et al., 2015) in increasing investor confidence that Islamic 
businesses understand Islamic ideological and legal frameworks, and in carrying out 
principles and rules of conduct (Akhtar, 2008). The majority of studies in this area 
investigated conventional companies; few studies of Sharia compliant companies 
    
23 
 
exist. The current study overcomes the lack of research on Sharia compliant 
companies by examining the relationship between internal corporate governance 
mechanisms and investor confidence, and whether consistency in status acts as a 
moderator strengthening the relationship between internal corporate governance 
mechanism and investor confidence. 
 
1.6.2 Practical Contribution 
1.6.2.1 To Investors 
 This study presents information about investors’ behavior toward Sharia 
compliant companies. This can assist investors in investment decision-making 
processes. It also outlines the critical elements of corporate governance that impact 
performance and investor confidence and, hence, are of primary consideration to 
investors in capital markets.  
1.6.2.2 To Corporate Managers 
 This study assists corporate managers to understand investors’ interest on the 
attributes of Boards of directors, internal corporate governance mechanisms, and the 
consistency of Sharia status of a company. This information, in turn, can inform a 
company’s policies and corporate operational systems for Sharia compliance. 
1.6.2.3 To Policy Makers 
 Regulators, bureaucrats, reserve banks, IMF analysts, NGOs, and other 
sponsored entities, who draft policies related to corporate governance can benefit 
from these findings. The consistency of Sharia status can be considered as a major 
criterion in determining the level of company compliance to Sharia principles, and 
therefore, this study helps policy makers to make better informed decisions. 
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1.7 Definition of Key Terms 
 The main terms used in this study are defined as follows: 
Investor confidence is equivalent to risk preference, representing investors’ 
willingness to take risks or investors’ optimism about their risky asset (Wise, 
2002). 
Corporate Governance is a structural and functional system, which attempts to 
ensure a firm is managed and controlled in a strategic, integrative, 
entrepreneurial, and holistic fashion and meets ethical guidelines (Cadbury, 
1992; Hilb, 2006). 
Corporate Governance Mechanism is defined, for the purposes of this study, as a 
mechanism controlling an organization, or a firm, in achieving its goals, 
which is designed to maximize the long-term benefits to the shareholders 
(Abu-Tapanjeh, 2006). 
Internal Corporate Governance Mechanism is factor operating inside a company. 
It is commonly a supervisory board of commission, or a committee engaging 
in performing controlling and monitoring activities to protect investors’ 
interests and public interests (Huson, Parrino, & Starks, 2001; Weir et al., 
2002; Nuryanah & Islam, 2011).  
Board Process is the method used by a board of directors in decision making (Zahra 
& Pearce, 1989).  
Board Structure separates the power of directors holding management position in a 
company (executive), and directors (non-executive) who perform controlling 
and monitoring functions to protect investors’ interests (Tricker, as cited in 
